A

AN APOLOGIE OF THE EARLE OF ESSEX, AGAINST THOSE WHICH IEALOVSLY, AND MALICIOVSLY, TAX HIM TO BE THE HINDERER OF THE PEACE AND QVIET OF HIS COVNTRY.

Penned by himselfe in ANNO 1598.

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AN APOLOGIE OF THE EARLE OF ESSEX.

¶ To Master Anthony Bacon.

HE that either thinketh he hath, or wisheth to haue an excellent face, no sooner is tolde of any spot or vncomelinesse in his coũtenance, then he hyes to shewe himselfe to a glasse; that the glasse may shewe againe his trewe likenesse vnto him: the same curiositie moues me, that desires to haue a faire minde, to shew the true face and state of my minde to my trew friend; that he like a trewe Glasse, without iniury, or flattery, may tell me whether Nature or Accident haue set so foule a blemish in it as my accusers pretend. I am charged that, either in affection, or opinion, or both, I preferre war before peace; and so consequently, that all my Counsels Actions and indeauours doe tend to keepe the State of England in continuall wars: especially at this time when some

ſay peace may be had,& I only impugne it: But both my heart diſclames from ſo barbarous an affection, and my iudgement from ſo abſurd an opinion. The reputation of a moſt faithfull ſubiect and zealous Patriot (which, with hazard of my life and decay of my eſtate, I haue ſought to purchaſe) muſt not ſuffer this ougly and odious aſperſion, *that my actions haue cauſed, maintained, or increaſed the warres, or had euer any ſuch ſcope or intent.*

Firſt, for my affection, in nature, it was indifferent to bookes & to Armes, & was more inflamed with the loue of knowledge, thē with the loue of Fame: witnes your rarely qualified brother, & that moſt learned & truely honeſt Maſter *Sauill*; yea my cōtemplatiue retiredneſſe in *Wales*, & my bookiſhneſſe from my very childhood. And now, if time reaſō or experiēce haue taught me to wiſh that to my ſelfe which is beſt for my ſelfe, what ſhould I not wiſh rather then martiall imploymēts? in which I haue empaired my ſtate, loſt my deare & only brother the halfe Arch of my houſe, buried many of my deareſt and neareſt friendes, and ſubiected my ſelfe to the rage of Seas violence, generall plagues, famine, and all kinde of wants, diſcontentmēt of vndiſciplined and vnruly multitudes, and acceptation of all euents; while I did not onely leaue my knowne enemies, elbowe-roome to ſeeke their owne and their friends aduancement, but was faine (ſometimes) vpon truſt in their proteſtation, after new reconcilements, to make them the receiuers, cenſurers and anſwerers of all my diſpatches. And, as my affection neither in truth is, nor, if I regard my ſelfe, in reaſon ought to bee ſet on theſe

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courses of the warres: so, in Iudgement, I haue euer thought warres, the diseases and sickneſſe; and peace, the true, naturall & healthfull temper of all States. I haue thought, *Excellent mindes should come to the warres, as Surgeons doe to their Cauteries*, when no other easie or ordinarie remedie will serue: or as men which are no way but by the sworde to proue the truth of their plea, and obtaine their detained right. Yea, I will goe one degree further: I think, that Prince, or State offends as much against Iustice and against reason, that omitteth a faire occasion of making an honourable and safe peace, as that which rashly and causeleſſely moueth an vniust warre.

These principles haue made me conclude this generall *Thesis* common to all States, that *Peace is to be preferred before warre*. I will come to an *Hypothesis* proper to the State of England. Where, most part of the wealth of the Land, and the reuenewes of the Crowne growes by traffick and entercourse: and where almost all traffick is interrupted by the warres: where the State in largeneſſe of Territorie and in wealth (which is the sinewes of warre) is inferior to that of the Enemie: where besides all forein warres, there is yet a great fire of rebellion vnquenched: wher associates in wars giue ouer the quarrell, neighbors are suspected, Newtrals shew ill affection, and the people it selfe growes wearie of the charge and miserie of the warres; there, of all places, peace should be imbraced (if it be offered) and sought for by fit & honourable meanes, if it may bee compaſſed. But, though warres be diseases, yet I thinke it better to endure some sickneſſe, then to venture vpon

euery medicine. I ſhould hold, that an enemy may be truſted, if he offer ſafe conditions, as a Phiſition may if he giue an wholſome and tryed medicine. But to truſt to an enemies faith, when his perfidie ſhall vndoe or extreamely endanger vs, and infinitely aduantage himſelfe, were *Medicum hæredem facere*. It is no cure to bring a State from a doubtful warre to an vnſafe treatie: it is no more then to put a feauerous bodie out of a hot fit into a cold. To cõclude, as an vnſkilfull Phyſition may, by working a natural bodie with his medicines, bring it from a Tertian or Quartan Feuer to an Hectick: ſo an vnprouident States man may with cõditions or treatie ſo diſarme a State of the friendes, reputation, and ſtrength it hath, as the cure will prooue farre worſe then the diſeaſe. Therefore it is not the name of War or Peace, but the circumſtances and conditions of either of them, that ſhould make vs fly the one, and imbrace the other. Now, what are the circumſtances of the Warre or Peace with *Spaine*, it ſhall appeare in his proper place in the Treatiſe following. But ere I paſſe further, let this profeſſion of my diſpoſition and affection to peace be chalenged to be but a faire prerence, & theſe rules which I avow to hold in Iudgement to be cõpared to the doctrin of ſome Diuines of our time, furtheſt of all from their practiſe. I muſt anſwere ſome obiections of my detractors, who will ſay, my entring into the actiõs of the lowe Coũtries, ere I was out of my pupillage, my putting my ſelfe into the Iorney for *Portugall* without charge or without leaue, my procuring my ſelfe the conducting of her Maieſties ſuccors to the French King in the yeare

91. my Sea iorneies these two last Sommers, wherin both my selfe & my friends ventured deeply of our owne priuate meanes, my neere friendship with the chiefe men of action, and generall affection to the men of warre of our Nation, and lastly my opposing against the Treatie of peace at this time, when others perswade vnto it: that all these, I say, are arguments that I wish not peace, but delight in warre. But for my going into the Low Countries, it neither the cõpany of my father in Law, the honorable charge of Generall of the horse in a faire Armie, when I was but nineteene yeares olde, the taking the start of mine owne ranke, when I sawe the State of England not onely dispose it selfe to great actions, but ingaged in them: If these reasons were not sufficient to warrant my course; yet consider what choyce I had, or what else I could haue done with my selfe. In the Court I had smal grace & few friends. In my house in the country, I had lyued a year, till the opinion of the world vpbraided me with more retiredneſſe, thẽ was fit for my yeares, or the present time. And to haue gone to trauell, when my Country sent out so great an armie, had beene as much as to haue turned ouer bookes onely to gaze on the Babies and pictures, while others were studying the sense. For to iustifie my going into *Portugall*, I must plead these circumstãces; First, of the person with whom I went, a poore distressed exiled King; whome I many times hearde repeate the storie of his owne oppressions. Secondly, of the enemies against whome I went; an insolent cruell, and vsurping Nation that disturbed the common peace, aspired to the conquest of my Countrie,

and a general enemy to the liberty of Christendom. Thirdly, of the cause in which I went; to deliuer the oppressed out of the hands of the oppressor, and (by giuing the Spaniard his handfulles at home) to free both mine own Country and our confederates, from the feare or danger of his attempts. And, last of all, the time in which I went; a tyme when mine eyes, ful of disdaine, had so lately seen the falsly called the *Inuincible Armado* saile by our shoares: when, all the braue harts, in the kingdome, boiled til they saw that insolent enemie taught both to knowe himselfe and to valewe vs. And when my heart was perswaded by these circumstances, I engaged my meanes, kinsfolkes, friendes, and followers: else neither the aduenture had bene made vp, nor the iorney performed; it being no auowed action of her Maiesties, but a meere aduenture of priuate men. And, when I was so farre in, I confesse I was not of their humour that loue towager vpon other mens heads, or to sit at home like Merchāts, whileſt their hopes & goods are ventured abroad. For my going without charge, & without leaue, I must auowe the one as out of councell; and excuse the other as by necessitie. I chose to goe without charge, that I might be free to execute the lesse. I commanded not; both that I might not be obnoxious to the successe, and because I had ouerthrowne the voiage, if I had stood for the Commission: and could take no second place; hauing, at the same time, and in the same armie, had place aboue the Generall. But though I had no charge, I made my brother Generall of the horse, my faithful friend Sir *Roger Williams* Colonel of the infantery;

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eight of my fast friends Colonels, and 20. at the least of my domesticks Captaines: so as I might haue partie and authoritie enough when I would. For my want of leaue, I must plead necessitie; her Maiestie hauing resolued to send none of my qualitie, and many at home shewing enuie enough to those poore gentlemen that were named: which made me see, with what successe, I should haue sued for leaue. For my conducting of her Maiesties succors to the French King, in the yeare 91. I must alledge, that the sending of the succors was resolued on, before my name was in question: and, if I had not offered my selfe to the Iorney, some other Noble man (that neuer had place in the warres) might (as the Phrase is in the Common Lawe) haue bene *promotus per saltum*: and so I, that neuer had had her Maiesties Commission to commaund in chiefe, should haue seene my Punies leapt ouer my head. Also I felt that my fortune bred me Enuie: and that Enuie procured me strong & dãgerous opposition; which could not haue bene withstoode but by her Maiesties great fauour: and that the greatnesse of her Maiesties fauor must grow out of the greatnesse of her seruants merits: & I saw no way of merit lye so open to me as by seruice in her wars; the times themselues and mine owne beginnings fitting with it; & at that time no man, in my Country, of my ranke, disposing himselfe that way. If, besides all this, it be considered, that I went to a King, who, for his admirable valure, and often fighting with his owne hands, was not onely the most famous, but the most renowned Captaine of Christendome: that the intended seruice was to free the mari-

tine parts of *Normandy*, from the hãds of the League and power of the Spaniard; that thereby the common enemy ſhould finde leſſe ſuccour or fauour in thoſe ſeas. If theſe things be well conſidered, I doubt not but my French iorney will be thought ſufficiently iuſtified. But perhaps in thoſe actions, where I had no charge at all, or was commaunded by others, or offered my ſelfe to the ſeruice, when the imployment was before reſolued on, I hauing no part nor intereſt in the Counſell, my Apologie will be better allowed, then in my two laſt ſea iorneyes, wherein I am charged to bee authour of the Counſell, and executor of the ſeruice.

Therefore firſt to the firſt. For the counſell of going to *Spaine*, I proteſt, I had no more part in it, then my Lord Threaſurer, my Lord Admirall, and Maſter Secretarie: who were all priuie from the beginning, and did aſſent and aduiſe to the iorney aſmuch as I did. Her Maieſtie did firſt arme for the denfenſiue; vpon intelligẽce that the King of *Spain* did both purpoſe and prepare to aſſaile her: finding that ſhe ſtrengthened the Low Contries and *Fraunce* againſt him, infeſted him in his *Indies*, and choaked him by ſea: ſo as his counſell reſolued it to bee the ſhorteſt and eaſieſt way to al his ends to begin with England. And when her Maieſtie was armed and able to take the ſtart, it was thought both a wiſe and ſafe Counſell not to looſe ſo great a charge, and ſo faire an opportunitie. For the proiect of going to *Cadize*, I haue euer confeſſed, it was my Lord Admirall my colleagues. If any man will ſingle me out, to charge me alone with any thing, it muſt be, that when all

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charge of the preparation was past, the armie leuied and marching to the Rendeuous, and the lowe countrey Fleete (that was to ioyne with vs in the way) ready, that then I was as constant to the iourney, as I had bin all the while before; when (for some priuate gaine to my selfe) I might haue sold the honour of my Soueraigne, the securitie of my countrey, the contentment of our cõfederates, the hopes and almost whole fortunes of hundreds of my friends, whom I had drawen into the iourney. If any man will vse so base a speech, as that wee offended the King of *Spayne*, so deepely, by that iourney, as he is more implacable and further from peace: I answere; *Vana sine viribus ira*: we brought away & burnt his shipping, destroied his sea prouisiõs, yea put him to such charge & losse, as he shortly after plaied bãkrupt with al his creditors. Let me euer see his strẽgth decrease, though his malice increase: rather then beleeue in his faith or good nature, when his strẽgth is great. If any mã wil of the other side obiect, Though we had good hap, yet our designe is nought; for this drew the warre to no end: I must confesse, I neither performed what I purposed, nor that which was don was sufficiẽt. I purposed to dwell in a port of the enimies, & to make a cõtinual diuersiõ: witnes my Letter to the Lords of the Coũcell, dated frõ *Plimmouth* the 1. of Iune 96. and deliuered by my secretary *Edward Raynolds* at *Greenewich* the 16. of the same moneth. And when I was possessed of *Cadize*, I offred to stay there with 3. or 400. men, if the whole Fleete could furnish vs but with 3. moneths victuals: witnes the whole Coũsaile of warre. And by that meanes I

doubted not, but to haue brought the wars in those parts to a short end, & haue made the King of *Spaine* wearie of seeking to dislodge me. But my Letter was neither answered nor liked here; nor I, at *Cadize*, enhabled to feed my selfe, and the men of warre, till a supplie might haue come. So as (except to haue beene of the same minde, that all my fellowes were that were called to Counsel, to haue ioined with my Lord Admirall, when he offred to take an equall cõmission of commaund with me by Sea and land, to haue sought as much as I could to haue weakened him that by all meanes he can seekes to destroy and Conquer vs, and to leaue of doing that, which I had not warrant nor meanes to do, be a fault) in my iourney 96. I cõmitted no fault. For my last iourney 97. let it be remembred how I was brought into it, with what Councell and designes I went out, and what were the true causes of our want of such successe, as in our owne hopes we promised to our selues: And then if I vndertooke more then duetie laied vpon me, or aduised any thing that reason made not probable, or failed in any thing that any possibilitie enabled mee vnto, I will thinke that the hardest censurers of me doe me no wrong. But, first, it is well knowen, that her Maiestie had armed and victualed tenne of her owne Shippes, and caused the States of the lowe Countries to prepare the like nomber, before I was euer spoken of to goe to Sea. And when my Lord *Thomas Haward*, and Sir *Walter Raleighe*, who should haue beene sent out with this force, thought the hopes of doing any great seruice weake and vncertaine, and the newes

of the *Adelantadoes* preparations at *Farroll* and the *Groyne* daily confirmed, a new Counsell was called: in which her Maiestie found, that this force prepared was too great for a discouerie, and too little for an attempt: that a Fleet, inferior to that which the *Adelantado* commanded, might light vpon some Merchants, or take Fishermen to learne newes, but should neuer be in any possibilitie to take any of the King of *Spaines* treasure, nor should safely lye on the Coasts of *Spaine*, or enter his Ports; being able to command no Port, nor daring to fight with the enemies Fleet when it should come out: and, lastly, that a Fleet without an Army to land, might saile frō Cape to Cape, and returne when their victuals were almost eaten, without doing other seruice. For, the *Adelantado* would not come forth if he liked not his match: and the *Indian* Fleet might bee stayed at the Islands; or, by aduises, directed so to alter their course, as they should hardly be intercepted. Then a new consultation was had what might be done with a sufficient force by sea and Land: It was resolued, that not onely *Farroll*, where the *Adelantado* lay, but any part of *Spaine* might be entred, and the force of the King (that should be found in it) beaten or destroyed, or any Port or Island of the enemies taken, and fortified, besides the commanding of any fleete of warre or of treasure (that should bee met with at Sea) if her Maiesties shippes and 5000. land soldiers, with vessels to transport them, were added to the former proportion. All which proportions being agreed vnto, and my Lord Amirall excusing himselfe from the iorney, by the indisposition of his body, I had

warning to prepare my ſelfe to take the charge. Whē I went out, my firſt deſigne was vpon *Farroll*, both by her Maieſties commandement and mine owne choice. For, when I had defeated that force, I might goe after whither I liſt, and doe almoſt what I liſt; I meane in any places vpon the Coaſt. And, of doing what I would vpon the Fleete and Armie at *Farroll*, I had little cauſe to doubt, if God had giuen me a fauorable paſſage, and a ſeaſon to land the armie and enter the Port: their preparations to reſiſt being all knowne, and little mouing any diſtruſt of the poſſibilitie or facilitie of this kinde of enterpriſe. I think, I haue ſatisfied you in ſome of my former papers; eſpecially in my diſcourſe written as I came home frō *Cadize*: and I will ſatisfie any reaſonable man, that will ſpeake with me of it. The aduantages that would haue growen by it are manifeſt. Her Maieſties Dominions, for a long time, from any inuaſion from *Spaine* had beene ſecured: the King of *Spaines* Eaſt & Weſt *Indian* Fleetes (both going out and comming home) vtterly vngarded: the taking of all the *Spaniſh* or *Portugall* Iſlands made eaſie: the enterpriſe of the Weſt *Indies* warranted from two of the greateſt dāgers, an encounter by ſea, and inuaſion at home, while her Maieſties forces were abſēt: To conclude, her Maieſtie had bene made ſuch an abſolute Queen of the Ocean, and her enemie ſo diſarmed by ſea, as ſhe might either enforce him to any conditions of peace, or make warre to her infinite aduantage and his vtter ruine. I had alſo thought vpon ſome place, which might be held for diuerſion of the wars. And, if euer the taking of the *Indian* Fleetes were likely,

I knew I should be in a faire way for it: though I confesse, I account those hopes so vncertaine, as I reckoned them no better thē by-chāces. But my first, chiefest, & mayn desigue was, to assaile the *Adelantado* in *Farroll*: *Farroll* was the Rendeuous I gaue: to *Farroll* I directly shaped my course: and at *Farroll* I had either mastered that Fleete, that had a whole yeare lien threatning my Country, and driuen their armie into the hils, or else sacrificed my selfe.

The causes of frustrating this desigue, were first, the violent long tempest, which tooke vs in the height of 46. scattered our Fleet, disabled and almost drowned most of our principall shippes, and (when wee could no longer bear it vp against the winde) draue vs back vpon our owne Coast. Next, that vnseasonable stormie weather, which kept vs a moneth (after we were put back) from attempting to goe forth againe. And lastly our wants: which forced vs to discharge the whole land armie, sauing 1000. men. For mine owne excuse, how long I endured ere I returned backe againe, and to what desperate case I brought my ship, there be witnesses enow. Also her Maiestie and her Councel knowes, what offer of seruice I made her when I came vp poast from *Plymmouth*, accompanied with Sir *VValter Rawleigh*, if she woulde haue let me goe but with halfe her Fleete, and lesse then halfe the land Armie, to such place as my selfe and the Councel of warre had chosen. This beeing done, the enemie and nor her Maiestie shoulde haue beene sure to feele the waight and charge of the iourney. And when her Maiestie accepted not of that offer, euen a little before

my last going forth, I wrote vnto her Maiestie to offer the attempting of the Fleet in *Farroll*, if she wold giue me leaue to hazard the 1000. old soldiers, with some number of Flyeboates and Merchants ships, and the Saint *Mathewe* and Saint *Andrew* (for my selfe, and one other Cõmander to goe in) as a guard to the rest, and as fit shippes to board the greatest of the Gallions; leauing all the Queenes shippes and the other principall Commaunders without the Bay, till wee had tryed our fortune. Of this Letter I receiued answere, tying me to hazard none but these; and yet with some lymitations. But I lost the Saint *Mathewe* by her breaking her foremast; and lost companie with the Saint *Andrewe* ere I came to the openning of the Groyne. And then the same night, while I was faine to lye by the Lee, for the stopping of a dangerous Leake, I lost the company of one of the Admirals of the squadrons (by a mischaunce that fell to his ship) with 30. saile, amongst which were many of the companies of soldiers: so as in effect I wanted all those meanes which were allotted for my attempt. And then I houered vp and downe the Coasts in those heights, whether I had directed such as should loose company to seeke mee in; and sent out Pinnaces euery way, til the Admiral of the Squadron that was missing sent me word whē I was in the height of 45. that the *Adelantado* was forth with his Fleete, and gone straight to the *Terceira*, to waft home the *Indian* Fleete. Then I resolued, after I had called a Counsell, to goe thither to seeke him. And though I failed of him, because he neuer offered to come forth till long after: yet I missed ve-

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ry narrowly and vnfortunately of the taking of the West *Indian* Fleete. If I had met with them before they had got into the *Tercera*, there would none of them haue escaped: and I had met with them, if a false intelligence had not made me stand one night a contrary way. But, it was the will of God, there should be no blowe stricken at Sea, that yeare: Else, when at the same time I returned from the Islands, and the *Adelantado* bare for the Coast of England, wee had not so narrowly missed one another as we did.

I haue now shewed you (worthy Master *Bacon*) with what minde I vndertooke those forraine imployments and actions of the warres. A word for my friendshippe with the chiefe men of action, and fauour generally to the men of warre: and then I come to their mayn obiection; which is, my crossing of the Treatie in hand. For most of them that are accompted the chiefe men of action, I doe confesse I doe entirely loue them. They haue bene my companions both abroad and at home: some of them beganne the warres with mee, most haue had place vnder mee: and many haue had me a witnesse of their rising from Captains, Lieuetenants and priuate men, to those charges, which since (by their vertue) they haue obtained. Now that I haue tryed them, I wold chuse them for friends, if I had them not: before I had tryed them, God and his prouidence chose them for mee. I loue them for mine owne sake: for I find sweeteneſse in their conuersation, strong assistance in their imployments with me, & happineſse in their friendship. I loue them for their vertues sake, & for

their greatneſſe of minde: (for, little mindes, though neuer ſo full of vertue, can be but a little vertuous) and for their great vnderſtanding: for to vnderſtand little things or things not of vſe, is little better then to vnderſtand nothing at all. I loue them for their affections: for, ſelf-louing men loue eaſe, pleaſure, and profit: but they that loue paines, danger, and fame, ſhewe that they loue publick profit more then themſelues. I loue them for my Countries ſake: for they are Englands beſt Armour of defence, and weapons of offence. If we may haue peace, they haue purchaſed it: If we muſt haue warre, they muſt manage it. Yet, while we are doubtfull and in Treatie, we muſt value our ſelues by what may bee done; and the enemie wil value vs, by what hath bene done by our chiefe men of action.

That generally I am affected to the men of warre, it ſhould not ſeeme ſtrange to any reaſonable man. Euery man doth loue them of his owne profeſſion. The graue Iudges fauour the ſtudents of the law: the Reuerent Biſhops the laborers in the miniſtery. And I (ſince her Maieſtie hath yearly vſed my ſeruice in her late Actions) muſt reckon my ſelfe, in the nũber of her men of warre. Before action, prouidence makes me cheriſh them for the ſeruice they can doe: in action, neceſſitie makes me value them for the ſeruice they doe: and after action, experience & thankfulneſſe makes me loue thẽ for the ſeruice they haue done. I knowe, that great ſcandall lyes vpon the profeſſion of Armes, as if it were a ſchoole of diſſoluteneſſe: but that growes by commaund and charge giuen to diſſolute chiefes; and it is a falt

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in the professors, and not in the profession. For, a Campe ought to bee (and so is, if it be well gouerned) the best schoole to make Religion truely felt, and pietie and honestie daily practised. For my selfe, I am sure, they that loue me least, if they know any thing of my gouernement, when I am abroade, will rather taxe me for being too seuere, then charge me for being too remisse or popular. But I long to leaue these disputatiõs that are but skirmishes; and will come to ioyne with mine aduersaries in the encounter, wherin they labour vtterly to ouerthrow my credite both with my Soueraigne and with my Countrie. They say, England cannot stand without peace, peace cannot growe but by Treatie, Treatie cãnot be had but whẽ the Enemy offers it; & that now, when the Enemy offers to treat, the doubtes I cast, and Arguments I frame, doe shew I would not haue her Maiesties Commissioners sent ouer. I answere, in a word, that if I saw thẽ build vpon any one true principle, I should not so much dissent from them as I doe. But, if they will promise themselues, that they may haue peace without ground, or thinke that peace shalbe good for vs without reason, or to leape blindfold into a Treatie with vndue circumstaunces; I say then I doe not suspect too much, but they too little. For a ground that we may haue peace, it is alledged that a Commission is come to the Cardinall out of *Spayne*; & that, by vertue of this Commission, he offers to send his Deputies to meet with her Maiesties. What is the conclusion? *Therefore the Enemy desires and intends peace.* Allowe this for a good syllogisme, and you may put to schoole al

the Logicians in Christendome. Yet I graunt, wee may conclude thus; that, *Therefore he makes shewe, as if he meant peace.* But remember how heretofore the Spanish Kings Lieuetenant and other ministers haue pretended Commission, when they had none; yea, haue drawen vs to treatie, ere they had receiued power to conclude. Remember also how that the King hath sent a Commission out of *Spaine* to be openly shewed, that Treatie might bee intertayned, when it is notorious to the worlde, he neuer meant to conclude any peace. Witnesse of all this the Duke of *Parma* his want of Commission, when by his Letters he drewe my Lord of *Darby*, and my Lord *Cobham*, and one other, Commissioners to the Treatie of *Berborough*; and, afterwards, their comming of a Commission when their great Nauie did presently appeare vpon our coasts, for the conquest of *England*. But doe they offer to treat, and meane no peace? What is then their meaning? If you will haue me interprete, I will tell you. Their first attempt against *England* was in 88. From that time to this present it is full 10. yeares; the iust time of the siege of *Troye*. And now that they see, open force cannot preuaile, they in shewe retyre and giue ouer Armes; but haue prepared a *Synons* Horse, which cannot enter, if wee cast not downe our walles. But, because we are thought more credulous then the Troyans were, the bare Letter of a base beggerly fugitiue, assuring vs that good faith is meant, as their vttermost Stratagem they vse to deceaue vs. But though some belieue, yet I say still, *Timeo Danaos, & dona ferentes.* If they

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appeale from my expositions, let their actions expound themselues. Will themselues charge vs at *Burborough* with failing to agree to peace? Or, will they haue vs beleeue that the Duke of *Medina* came with that huge Nauie, and Armie, onely to bee a witnesse to the contract? Or, if they had rather their owne wordes should expound their meanings then their actions, hear *Emanuell Lewis* the *Portugal*, their messenger, that brought *Lopus* and *Stephano Ferrara* assurance for 50000. Crownes to be paid, as soone as their diuelish Conspiracie against the life of our precious Soueraigne should take effect. Heare him I say, who, at his arraignement in *Guild-hall*, confessed at the Barre, that in their Cypher or Iargon, where they wrote of peace, they intended the death and murther of her Maiestie. Or, if the peace must not bee condemned to be insidious, vnder two witnesses, heare also *Antonio Rauston* now prisoner in the Tower of *London*: who comming hither out of *Spaine*, with a pretence of making ouerture of a peace (and for a better colour bringing Letters to her Maiesty, to your selfe, and to me, from *Croswell* the Iesuite to that end) confessed vpon his examination, taken by master Secretarie and my selfe, that his trewe errant giuen by some of the King of *Spaines* chiefest ministers, was, to discouer the state of our preparations, to assure the Papists of England, that they might shortly expect their deliuerance, to winne some Councellors about her Maiestie, or Noblemen of this Kingdome to fauour their cause, and to offer mee, from the King of *Spaine*, what tytle, some of money or pension, I

would desire, so as I would bee wonne to take their part.

Iudge now (worthy Master *Bacon*) out of the clearnesse of your owne iudgement, how I should vnderstand their offer or speach of peace: and thinke out of the worthynesse of your owne hart, what peace my heart could take with them that haue attempted to conquer my Country, practised to murder my Soueraigne, and sought out me as a fit man to be tempted to betray both my Queene and Country. But, if God had not put me back, & arrested me by contrary windes and Tempests, this last Sommer, I should haue taught that proud King, what effect his offers had wrought in mee: And the longer the will of God and my Soueraigne doe restrain mee, with the greater interest I hope to pay him in the end.

But our peace-makers may alleage, that times are changed, and with the times the humours of Princes and affaires of States doe commonly change: so as, though heretofore there was no trust to be giuen to the enemies words or faire shewes; yet now his humour, and the consideration of his owne affaires, may dispose him to make peace. For my part, ere I can beleeue he is of such a peaceable humour, I must know how his ambitious and reuengefull humours are satisfied or quenched. Satisfied they cannot be; for he hath receiued ouerthrowes in incounters, ill successe in his attempts, and losse and scorne in all the warres, hee hath had with her Maiestie. Quenched they are not like to bee: for if apprehension of death would haue quenched them, he would not the last year, whē he came newly out of that Trance

which

which was thought would haue ben his last swoune, haue aſked (the firſt word that hee ſpake) whether the *Adelantado* were gone for England. Or if remorſe of Conſcience would haue quenched them, he wold not, in his deuotions being at Maſſe, haue vowed to be reuenged on England, though he ſould all thoſe Candleſticks vpon the Altar before him. Of the firſt of theſe ſpeaches, my ſelfe, and ſome of my fellowe Councellors haue ſeene very credible aduertiſmēt out of *Spaine*: And the ſecond was deliuered both to you & me, by the mouth of a principall Ieſuite newly come from *Spaine*. But wee may well conclude, that this humour is not like to change. For he will neuer think he hath a ſufficient part of the Earth, till his mouth be full of earth: and ſome of his Ghoſtly Fathers the Ieſuits will as well perſwade him, that the inuaſions of others Princes Kingdomes is a worke of pietie, as they doe teach deſperate conſpirators, that to murder Princes is the way to Heauen. And if he ſhould dye to morrow, his ſons blood wil be hotter, & his humor of ambitiō like to be greater; as hauing bene bred, in *Domo regnatrice*: & his mind ſhewes to bee alreadie ſwolne *Vetere & inſita Auſtriacæ familiæ ſuperbia*. So as, in his peaceable humors there being no hope, let vs ſee what there is in the preſent ſtate of their affaires.

Princes or States, whē they enter into cōſideration of their owne affaires, may diſpoſe them ſelues to peace, for vtilitie, cōueniencie or neceſſitie. For vtility, if they can get aduātage: for cōueniency, if peace be fitteſt to cōſerue them in the ſtate they are: for neceſſity, when they haue no lōger means to make war.

That it is likely the King of *Spaine* will make peace with vs, becauſe thereby hee ſhall get aduantage of vs, our peace-makers will not agree: and if they do, it is our owne fault it wee fall into the pit, that they ſhewe vs ſo plainely. That he ſhould not be enclyned to peace with England for conueniencie (if neither aduantage entice him, nor neceſſity force him) I reaſon thus; All States doe ſtande aſmuch by reputation, as by ſtrēgth: eſpecially where their Dominions are diuided, and where a fewe of one Nation giue the Lawe to great multitudes of many. Now, let the *Indies*, the Lowe Countries, *Naples*, *Millane*, and *Sicilie* ſee, that *Spaine*, which hath ſo long tyrannized ouer them, is glad (after ſo many ouerthrowes, diſgraces and loſſes) to make peace with England vpon equall termes, and they will know that Spaniards are but *hombros come los otros*; and that it hath beene baſeneſſe in them, all this while, *ſeruitutem ſuam quotidie emere, quotidie paſcere*. So that I conclude; By ſuch a peace, *Spaine* ſhould looſe all reputation of his Armes and terrour of his greatneſſe: and his Countryes would not bee kept from rebelling, by any poſſibility. And therefore conueniencie could not mooue him to make peace with vs. That neceſſitie or want of meanes to make warre ſhould driue him to it, I thinke it both improbable & impoſſible. Improbable, that he, who ſo lately aſſayled *England*, *Fraunce*, & the lowe Countryes at once, hauing now broken the band of our League, and diuided *Fraunce* from the other two, ſhould thinke himſelfe vnable to maintaine warre with vs. Impoſſible that hee ſhould lack meanes. For, wants he

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treasure to pay his Armie? his *Partulo*, to pay his Armie, is made with the *Genowaies* for a great time to come. And as his enterprises are his Eb-tydes, to make his treasure runne lowe: so, his *Indian* returnes are his floods that fill the banks againe. Wants hee men? why, besides all his new leauies, he hath those forces that were imployed in *Fraunce*, free to be vsed against vs. Wants he victuals? besides al the helps he was wont to haue, he shall now by the peace with *France* haue as much as he list. Wants he ships? he builds euery day, & may imbar in *Spain* as many as he will; and is now cõbining both with the Easterlings, & conspiring with them against vs. So as I conclude, which way soeuer I turn my selfe, I see no likelyhood of disposing himselfe to peace with vs. And, if no peace be to be had, then no treatie to be entred into. For, from him, by entertaining treaty, wee can drawe nothing nor succour any body: wheras he may make vs and our onely confederates so iealous one of the other, as that in stryving to take the start, we striue, who should loose themselues first. But, if I allowe our peace-makers their assurance of peace, let vs see what is their purchase. If they can make any peace with *Spaine* good for vs, it must be by including our confederates of the Lowe Countries, or excluding them. But, I suspect neither of these can bee good or safe for vs: Therefore I iudge, they can make no good peace at all. To conclude the Lowe Countries in our peace, it is impossible: except they acknowledge the K. of *Spaine*, (or him that shall claime vnder him, for their Soueraigne) as Duke of *Burgondie*. Which if they do, all things that shal giue power

to the enemie, ſhal bring ſlauery to the *Netherlanders*, & preſẽt dãger vpon vs all wil neceſſarily enſue. The reaſon is manifeſt. For, when the authority of the generall States, & the preſent forme of gouernment of the vnited Prouinces ſhalbe broken & diſſolued, a Monarchy ſet vp, & a Prince acknowledged, there ſhall nothing limit the Princes abſoluteneſſe, but his owne wil: The ſtrength of a contract cãnot limit it. For, neither wil he keepe faith with thoſe he coũteth heretikes, & calleth rebels: neither will they make any long delay to betray thẽſelues. For, Prouince will ſtriue with Prouince, Towne with Towne, & mã with man, who ſhalbe moſt obſequious, & ſhew thẽſelues moſt ſeruile; all care of defence neglected, by minds bewitched with the name of peace; al memory of former tyranny blotted out of the harts reſolued to accept a Soueraigne. Some will ſeeke for charge of ſoldiers: ſome for magiſtracy in townes: ſome for gathering of Cuſtom, or hãdling of money: ſome for office of Iuſtice: ſome for benefices & ſpiritual liuings: all for trade into *Spaine* & the *Indies*: In briefe, euery man for priuate gaine; & no man for publick ſafetie. The Magiſtrats & gouernours cãnot limit it. For the chief mẽ, which now bear rule in Martial & Ciuil gouernment, will prouide by flight for their own ſafety. For, if the braue Count *Egmount* bought the truſt & confidẽce in his Maieſtie with no leſſe then the price of his own head, what may any low Countrie-ſubiect hope for? And when his memorable ſeruice eſpecially in thoſe two famous battails of *Grauelin* & S. *Quintines*, & his putting himſelfe into the Spaniards hãds, could not ouerweigh the ſuſpicion of cõbining himſelfe

selfe with the reuolters, what hope of future merite shal weigh downe the offence of those, who by Coũsell or actiõ haue mainteyned the state of the vnited prouinces against Spanish guarrisons? Troupes of souldiers, cãnot limit it: for there wilbe no means to pay thẽ. When any thing aboue the kings ordinary rents or duties is demaunded of the people, it wilbe answered, Is he our enemy? why do we acknowledge him for our Prince? Is he our Prince? why are we armed against him, like an enemie? Besides that, allow straũgers on both sides, and the enemy will oppresse thẽ vpon any sodaine by force. For his means depẽd vpon himselfe: the other (namely the States) vpon a people that wilbe glad to spare their purse, whẽ they see no present wars: & the enemies nõber wilbe far greater then the States. Banish straungers on both sides, & the enemy will oppresse them sodainly vpon euery occasion; being strengthened with *Espanioli-zed Netherlanders*, & the States defended by such only as shall take oath to the enemy. Stipulation of other Princes cannot limit it. For the States wilbe oppressed on a suddaine, when their helpes will come too late. And those Princes that were glad to make peace, when the enemy was weake, thẽselues being vnited, and the Lowe coũtries flourishing, wil not begin a new quarell when the enemies strength is recouered, thẽselues diuided, & the Low coũtries lost. Yet these, which I haue named, are the best assurances that either our peace-makers can propound, or the vnited Prouinces receaue. I will adde further, that as it is certaine, that no peace is to be had for the vnited Prouinces, except a Soueraigne be

acknowledged: so is it without all doubt, they cannot be included, except the Popish religion be either vniuersally established, or at least freely exercised in the townes and Prouinces, whēce it is now banished.

Allow the first, & they banish Gods true seruice, to bring in idolatrie: they leaue the truth, to receiue falshood: they refuse the protectiō of the most merciful Lord of heauē, to winne the fauour of the most tyrannicall Prince on earth. Allow but the second (a pluralitie of Religions) which is lesse, and it is against the policie of all States: because where there is no vnity in the Church, there can be no vnitie or order in the State: yea, it is the manifest ruine of that State. For, as the mingling of poison with holesome liquor in one vessell, doth not correct that which is lethall, but corrupts that which is wholesome: so the poisoned doctrine of those venificall *Espanioli-zed Iesuites*, once brought in, will quickly leaue no one professour in all the vnited Prouinces. So that I conclude, It were both folly & impietie for them to make any such peace, or for vs to drawe them to it: yea, more follie in vs, then euer was committed by any State. For, what will not the Enemy be able to do vpon vs, when, besides the forces he now hath, he shall haue a whole Countrie in his hands able to find him 60. or 80. thousand Souldiers, 300. shippes of warre, besides infinite number of transporting vessels and commodious Portes, that are but a daies sayling from the very hart of England.

But the lowe Countries shalbe giuen to the *Infanta*, and she maried to the Archduke *Albert*, and so that State diuided from the crowne of *Spayne*, and in a farre

a farre safer hand for the disuniting of them. I answere; the *Infanta* is, if the King of *Spaine* haue no children, to be heire to her brother, and her brother likewise to her: and then are those States vnited. The onely likelihoode of their remaining seuered, is, if they both haue children. And yet, since almost none of that house may marry further then cosen germaines, I see not why wee should not suspect theyr coniunction by such a match. But, allow them seuered: Is not *Albert* sonne in Lawe to the present King, and brother in Lawe to the future? Is hee not to bee backed by the force of *Spaine*, and maintained by the purse of *Spaine?* Will hee not serue a Spanish Kings turne aswell to ioyne in warre against England, as the Duke of *Sauoy* (that maried the other sister) did, in a warre against *Fraunce?* Nay, hath hee not a suspected strength of his owne, by beeing brother to the present Emperour, and not vnlike to be Emperour himselfe hereafter? Nay: is not the *Infanta* the same person, whose tytle, to the Crowne of *England*, *Parsons* so laboreth to proue? Is not the Lowe Countries the Rise, by which shee may leape into England? Is not such a peace, as this in hand, the onely means to assure her of all the Low Countries? Is not the Armie, which is now vnder her newe husband, the force on which the enemy, for the enterprise of England, must set his rest? Yes, yes: this coherence is manifest, and their deseigne clearely discouered. And it is too plaine what is like to bee expected of our peace, if wee include the Lowe Countries: Let vs now examine, how good it will be if we abandon them. I haue euer thought

that such a peace may be good for vs, if they that perswade vnto it, can perswade three things; First, that they of the Lowe Countries may haue both will & strength to maintaine the warre, though wee make peace. Secondly, that, so we leaue them, wee may haue good conditions for our selues. And thirdly, as our affaires now stand, how a newtrality can bee possibly kept by vs, while the vnited Prouinces and the enemy shall bee in warre togither. In the will of the Lowe Countries to continue in warre, & to refuse all conditions that the enemie shall offer, I vnderstand the resolution of the Councell and gouernours of the State, and the conformity of the people to such a resolution. In their strength, I meane aswel the strength of the gouernors to force the people if they bee aduerse, as the strength and sufficiency of their meanes to endure so sharpe and great a warre as wil fal vpon them.

Of the chiefe Gouernours resoluing, there may bee these doubts; That they shall bee tempted with the enemies offers, (who, if hee can, will purchase them seuerally, that he may reduce them vniuersally) and that they shall bee terrified with the daunger of the Councell. For, it both sounds harshly before hand, and it is like to fall out vnsuccesfully at the very first; the enemie being so much master of the field, as some places may easily be carried. I know they doe pretend to be resolute on warre, and protest against giuing eare to treatie: But that may bee, either to mooue vs by example, or to make vs leaue pressing of them to treatie, or to seeme to holde out to the very last; that we rather

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may bee thought to haue vndone them, then they to vndoe themselues. But if they, vpon mature deliberation, should chuse the continuance of the warres, as the lesse of the two euils: yet, that the people will bee like affected, it is not probable. For, when a people, that hath beene long tyred with the miserie of warre, shall heare the pleasing name of peace: when they, which had two mightie princes ioyned with them in a streight offēsiue & defensiue League, shall see thēselues abandoned, first by *Fraunce*, and then by *England*: when on the one side, for the maintainance of the warre, they shall haue great and newe contributions demaunded of them; and on the other side, they shall bee offered all plausible conditions of peace: Nay, when they see that England, by making peace, shall get the trade of *Spaine* from them; and they alone, by standing out, shall bee barred of that nauigation which hath made them so mightie in shipping, and so encreased in riches: what then the multitude is like to chuse, it is easie to iudge. And if the people bee not conformable of themselues, how by authoritie of the Gouernours of the States (which are called the generall States) they may bee enforced, I doe not well see. First, because it is not an absolute and necessarie, but a lymited and voluntarie obedience which they yeeld: Secondly, because their State hath not (as the State of *Rome* had, or as the State of *Venice* hath) one place, which as the head doth commaund and direct all the parts of the bodie; but is compoun- of equall parts. *Zealand* is as absolute as *Holland*:

and *Friezeland* as either of them: yea, not onely the leaſt Prouince, but euen the leaſt towne holds it ſelf to haue a kinde of Soueraintie, and will haue as free a voice as the greateſt. Thirdly, becauſe of their former manner of proceedings: which hath not beene to ſend commaundements to binde, but deputies to perſwade: not to reſolue and conclude in their greateſt cauſes in any one counſell or aſſembly; but to ſownd & feele the diſpoſition of euery Prouince, and ſo to winne them to like of that, they haue deuiſed of. And, becauſe euen among themſelues they are for the time general States, there is not like to be vnanimity in opinion. And then, though they that diſſent, beeing fewe, will not beare the Enuie to ſtand in Councell againſt the greater part: yet it is eaſie for them when they come home, to worke, in their peculiar Prouinces and townes, ſuch a diſtaſte of that which ſhall bee generally propounded to all, as that the reſolution will ſtick, and the whole buſineſſe be ouerthrowne; it being vnſafe for them to denye liberty of voice to any, ſince liberty is the trew cauſe of their taking Armes, and ſtanding out againſt the common enemie. But admit, both by the Gouernours and people, it were reſolued that the Low Countries alone ſhould continue in warre, how are their meanes, or is their ſtrength likely to mantaine warre? Of all foraine helpe they are vtterly deſtitute: *Fraunce* makes no diuiſion: England can yeeld no ſuccours: and, in all Chriſtendom, there is no other Prince or State likely or able to backe them. Their owne means and abilitie growes either by the fruits of the earth, or by traffique and Marchandize. For

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the fruites of the earth, that meanes is like to be smal. For, the enemy being master of the field, and able to diuide his forces into diuers places, will euery day either winne from them part of that they now hold; or at least so infest those parts, that are in the States obedience, as except it bee in *Holland* or *Zeland*, (which the enemie cannot get) husbandry will bee ill followed and yeelde little profit. And as for their meanes by traffick, it is vnlikely that Merchants that may remoue their dwellings to peaceable places neere hand (where they may haue safe and free trade) will remaine in the Lowe Countries; which onely, of all these parts of Christendome is in warre. And if they doe keepe their dwellings, yet will the Spaniard, without all doubt, banish them from trade into *Spaine*, (when both the French, English and the Easterlings shall supply him) and will seeke to banish and impeach them of al other trades, as much as hee can: pretending, that they now are the onely perturbers of the peace of Christendome. So as I conclude, when I thinke with my selfe, what the Gouernours of the State of the vnited Prouinces are like to resolue, what the people in generall will bee like to desire, how hardly the multitude can bee forced against their liking, or the meanes of the Lowe Contries make them subsist of themselues, I see nothing but danger; and that the enimie will shortly and sodainely bee master of all that Country. Which how much that importeth vs to preuent, it hath before beene made plaine.

I will now consider, what condicions wee are like to haue for our selues, so that we will forsake our confederates. Restitution of places wee cannot demaund as *Fraunce* did: for the enemy holds none of ours. Reparation of damage we as little seeke for: for from him we haue sustained no losse. And trade into the *Indies* our zealous peace-makes wil not stād for; least the enemy offended will grant no peace at all. Traffick into *Spaine* or *Portugall* we shal haue: and that is the onely condition, that carries any shew of aduātage to vs. But if we do wel consider how greedy our Merchants will bee of such a trade at the first, and how easie it will bee, for a faith-breaking King & enemie, to confiscate al our Countrymens goods, and to imbarre and vse English shipping against England, wee would not bragge too much of that aduantage. But on the other side, he will require alterations in our gouernment, or in the execution of our Lawes for matter of Religion, deliuering vp the townes her Maiestie holdes in the Lowe Countries, and reparations of al damages sustained by the wars, The first is a condition onely fit for a Conquerour to impose; and vnfit for a braue State (that in all the warres hitherto hath had the better) once to heare mentioned. The second should neuer bee asked of a Queene, so iust, as shee will not yeelde vp the keyes of a Country, deliuered her by her best cō-federates, into the hands of her greatest enemie; nor of a Prince so wise, as she will not adde strength to him, whose strength already she holdes so much suspected; nor yet inhable him to inuade, whose

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ambition and malice thristeth after both inuasion and conquest. The third condition is impossible to be graunted. For, the losse, which the King of *Spayne* hath receaued in these warres, amounteth to a greater summe, then the Treasure of all the Kings in Christendome. If it bee asked, how I knowe that these conditions wilbe demaunded: I answere, that I learne *Albertus* minde of *Albertus* himselfe; and the Spanish conditions, out of the instructions giuen to the Spanish Commissioners. If it bee said, that though it appeare, by the intercepted Letters and instructions, that such conditions should be asked, yet it was neuer meant, that they should be insisted vpō: I answere, that in the instructiōs to the Spanish Cōmissioners it is expresly set downe, in the first & third condition, that the Legate shalbe pressed to vrge the French king to stand with thē in obteyning them: and for the second, if the English cōmissioners did cut of all hope of deliuering the Townes, that then the Treatie shall instantly breake off. Which is as much, as if they should say; except the English wil giue vs the Keyes of the lowe Countries (whereby we may reduce them) and let vs haue the Porte of *Vlushing* (in which our Gallies may winter, and from which wee may set out our Fleete for the Conquest of England, whensoeuer we will breake) wee will haue no peace with England for a time. But, if it bee graunted, that the lowe Countries will maintaine the warres alone, and that *Spayne* will graunt vs good Conditions, so we will abandon the States, how will it then appeare, that it is possible

for vs betwixt theſe two to hold a Newtralitie. If we doe not the vnited Prouinces ſome fauour vnder hand, or at leaſt by letting them be ſerued by ſuch of our nation as will voluntarily offer themſelues to thē, their State cannot be mainteined, nor they kept our friends whom we ſuffer to periſh. On the other ſide, if wee doe them in this kinde, or in any other, any fauour which ſhall keepe them from periſhing, we giue *Spayne* and the Archduke a iuſt occaſion of quarrell; and ſo make them (of our new friends) become our enemies. Beſides, her Maieſtie hath beſtowed in the Action of the lowe Countries at the leaſt foure millions of Crownes: and ſhe hath in pawne, for the dette which the States owe her, the Townes of *Vluſhing* & the *Brill* To reimbourſe that which is due, and mainteyne the warres, the States are vtterly vnable. To deliuer the townes without reimbourſement were vtterly to looſe all the Treaſure lent, and the aucthoritie and bridle which her Maieſtie hath vpon that people: which is one of the greateſt ſecurities of her eſtate. To keepe them, eſpecially *Vluſhing*, and to remaine in Newtralitie (to my vnderſtanding) ſeemes altogether impoſſible. For when the Enemy ſhall ſee, that, neither by treatie nor by the offer of his large Conditions, the States will be wonne, he will aſſaile them by force: yea he will take that way, which ſhalbe ſhorteſt and eaſieſt for the reduction of the whole: which wilbe, to bring his Gallies into their Riuers, and to tranſport his men into the Iſlands. For ſo, by pearcing into *Zealand*, he ſhall make his way into *Holland*: and,

if

if hee haue once good footing in theſe two Prouinces, hee is ſtreight maſter of all that whole State. If *Vluſhing* (which is thē only Bulwarke againſt Ilanders) and the Caſtle of *Kympkins* (which commandeth the Riuer of *Slade*) ſhal not impeach nor offend the enemie, hee will carry all the reſt of the Iſlands of *Watreuen*, and ſo conſequently all *Zealand*. If after hee is become her Maieſties friend, hee be vſed as an enemie, by the places ſhee holdes, the peace is broken.

But though it were prooued neuer ſo fully, that the peace which we may haue (if wee may haue any at all) is full of dangers and inconueniences, yet ſome are ſo zealous of it, as they will ſay, It is the miſery of our State, that we can neither haue a good peace, nor a good warre: and of two euils it is better to haue a patched peace, then an vnſupportable warre. But iniurious are theſe men to the men of warre, (that fight for them & defend them) in thinking their Armes (which haue euer done honour to our Nation and ſtricken terror into the hearts of our enemies) leſſe able to defende our Country, then their Treaties; which haue neuer bin free from ſcorne and diſaduantage. Iniurious they are to the Country that hath bredde them: which, being one of the braueſt ſtrongeſt and happieſt States in Chriſtendome, is iudged by theſe men, to bee as weake as their owne weake hearts: Iniurious they are to her Maieſtie; who, beeing ſo great, ſo glorious, & ſo victorious a Queene, ſhall bee iudged vnable to maintaine warre; when ſhee cannot haue peace,

but at the pleaſure of her enemie. Yea, iniurious & moſt vnthankfull are they to God himſelfe, (who hath hetherto fought for them) in that (for an vnſafe peace with an Idolatrous and irreligious Nation) they would leaue an honourable and iuſt warre. When they haue done all they can, if the enemy will not conclude peace, wee muſt haue warre. And ſhall not reaſonable men bee perſwaded, aſwell by neceſſitie of reaſon, as by neceſſitie of fortune? But wherein doe they finde ſuch inſufficiencie to maintaine the warre? Our Nauie, as alſo that of our confederates, were neuer ſtronger; nor the enemy in ſhipping halfe ſo weake. Our men generally were neuer ſo Martial, nor euer had ſo many able leaders: our confederates of the Lowe Countries (who, beeing firmely knitte vnto vs, are of more vſe then all the friendes in Chriſtendome, that we euer had or can haue) they I ſay were neuer more reſolute. *Fraunce* hath felt it, & wee are eaſed of many charges, and ſhall make warre in fewer places. *Ireland* is chargeable: that charge may well bee borne, when it is almoſt the ſole burden that lyes vpon vs. Yet, if there bee any weakneſſe in our meanes to make warre, it is in our treaſure. But, if bee conſidered, how for this preſent yeare, *Spaine* hath no ability to aſſaile vs; how the next yeare, the yearely ſubſidies will beginne to be paide; how in *Fraunce*, wee haue an ende of all charges, and are now to receiue reimbourſement of all that is due; how in the Lowe Countries her maieſties expences may likewiſe ceaſe, and ſhe receiue ſome helpe towards her

her other charges; Yea, and though her Maisties treasure bee drawne deepe into, and the poore husbandman by these late hard yeares past hath now scant left any meanes to liue: yet, if our sumptuous buildings, our surfetting dyet, our prodigality in garments, our infinite plate and costly furniture of our houses bee well considered, England cannot bee thought poore. Can wee exceede all Nations in Christendome in wastfull vanities? and can we not arme our selues against one Nation (which wee haue euer beaten) for our necessarie defence? Was *Rome* so braue a State, as that the very Ladies, to supply the common treasure and to maintaine the warres, spoyled themselues of their Iewels and rich ornaments? and is England so base a State, as that the people therein will not bestow some part of their superfluous expences to keepe themselues from conquest and slauery? Did the godly Kings and religious people, which wee reade of in the old Testament, to maintaine the warres against the enemies of God, sell the ornaments of the Temple and things consecrated to holy vses? and shall wee, that haue as holy a warre, spare those thinges that wee haue dedicated to our idle and sensuall pleasures? Could our owne Nation, in those gallant former ages, when our countrie was farre poorer then now it is, leauie Armies, maintaine warres, atchieue great conquests in *Fraunce*, and make our powerful Armes knowne as far as the Holy Land? and is this such a degenerate Age, as wee shall not bee able to defend England? No: there is yet

left ſome ſeede of that auncient vertue. Remember with what ſpirit and alacrity, thē gentlemen of England haue put themſelues voluntarily into our late actions. There wil euer be found ſome *Valerij*; which (ſo the ſtate may ſtand and floriſh) care not though they leaue not wherewith to burie thēſelues; though others burie their money, not caring in what caſe they leaue the State.

Wee, thanks be to God, haue a Queene, who hath neuer beene waſtefull, in her priuate expence: yet will ſhee ſell her plate and Iewels in the Tower, ere her people ſhall bee vndefended. We are a people, that will turne our ſilke Coates into Iron Iacks, and our ſiluer plate into Coates of plate, rather then our Soueraigne ſhall be vnſerued. But why ſhould either Prince or people be put to that extreamitie? If her Maieſtie will but be pleaſed to beſtowe 60000. pound a yeare, which the Lowe Countries doe coſt her, and the 20000. pounds a yeare which the States do offer her, and 20000. pounds a yeare more, which I doubt not may bee drawen (by way of reimburſement) from the French King; This 100000. pounds a yeare, with halfe as much more beſtowed by the States (who, to engage her Maieſtie in maintenance of the warre, will neuer ſhrinke, for their portion) this ſumme, I ſay, of 150000. pounds a yeare put into the hands of an honeſt and ſufficient Treaſurer for the warres, and to bee iſſued by a Councell of warre well choſen, will fully & ſufficiently maintaine the warre with *Spaine*. Yea, if this bee doubted, it ſhall bee made plaine, that with 150000. pounds a

yeare

yeare, such a force shall be maintained, as her Maiestie hauing a conuenient nũber of her owne ships, and repairing and furnishing them, as yearely shee doth, the enemy shal bring no fleete into these Seas, for *England*, *Ireland*, or the Lowe Countries, but it shall be beaten; nor seeke to gather one into *Spaine*, but the parts of it shal be defeated, before the whole be assẽbled. Yea, those seruices shal be done vpõ the enemie, that the poorest Prince or State in Christẽdome shall haue little cause to feare his malice. But of this question, whether we should iudge the peace good for vs which our peace-makers would procure, I haue entreated of sufficiently. I now come to the last question and maine matter of all; whether they doe enter into the treatie of it, with dewe circumstãces. And herein my purpose is not to stand vpon complementall circumstances, or points of honour; which in their proper time and place, are worthy of due consideration: But, the materiall circumstances which any Prince or State should waigh before they enter into any treaty I iudge to be these; The time of treating (whether it yeeld most aduantage for peace or warre) the persons of the Treators (whether the enemie with whome wee treat may make aduantage or no, by pretence, if nothing be concluded) the assurance of the treatie or strength of the knotte that is tyed, and how the State and condition were like to be, whensoeuer it breakes off and dissolues. The only reason wherby they, that wold haue peace, doe vse to prooue, that this season is fittest, & yeelds most aduantage for peace, is; That now the King of

Spain is ſo weake & poore, as he wil be now brought to that, which hee neither would heretofore, nor wil hereafter euer agree vnto: therefore (ſay they) now is the onely time for peace. But ſure, except they were better Logiciãs, and could frame better Arguments, I ſhould ſcarce wiſh them to be truſted with arguing for a peace. Their concluſion is directly contradictory to their owne propoſition. For now, of all other times, is hee moſt vnable to encounter vs in warre? then is this (of all other times) our fitteſt ſeaſon to make warre. Is this the ſeaſon he chuſeth to recouer himſelfe by peace? then of all other times, peace ſhould now be leaſt granted him. Now, now is the fitteſt time to make warre vpon the Spaniard. His loſſes are not yet recouerd, his coffers not filled, his fleete not made, his ſea prouiſions not ſupplyed, his *Indies* not quiet, and his ſonne in Law as yet (in his new Soueraignty) not fully ſettled. But her Maieſties late victories haue made way to her greater and farre higher attempts. Terrour accompanies the powerfulneſſe of her Armies: feare poſſeſſeth the harts of her enemies: & God himſelf, by her ſucceſſe, hath iudged her cauſe. All the world hath ſeene what hath happened of her late actions paſt: & the cõmon concluſion is, *Victoriæ cauſa dijs placuit.* On the other ſide, now (of all times) is the vnfitteſt ſeaſon to make peace: when the State of our beſt confederates is ſo vndermined by practiſe, threatned with force, & ſolicited to their owne vndoing by foraine Princes, as that except we both encorage thẽ & cleaue faſt vnto thẽ, their ruine is at hand. Now it is no time to make

peace

peace with the chiefe enemie of our Religion, when a cõspiracy is in hãd against al the professors of it. The news is too rife, & too credible, that this vndertaking Pope (after victories so glorious in *Tenera*, & his powerful reconciling of two so great Kings in the heat of so great a warre) will not now leaue till hee make a generall league against all such, as doe not or will not acknowledge the omnipotencie of his *Bulles*. Now if wee shewe our selues so weake, as that wee follow not the aduantage wee haue, wee shall hereafter be thought so weake as wee may haue any conditions imposed vpon vs. Now if we refuse the conditions, which our friends will offer to purchase our constancie, we must hereafter resolue to take such conditions as the enemie will giue; though it be to our losse. Now, if we will flatter our selues, that our agreeing to peace, when the enemy desires it, can make a sownde and durable league betwixt vs, wee shall vndoubtedly finde, when it is too late, that, *Inter victos victoresq; nunquã solida fides coalescit.* Adde vnto the circumstaunce of time, the circumstaunce of persönes, and it will appeare, that the pretence and beginning to treate of peace, without cõcluding, is like to be very gainefull to the enemy, and preiudicial to vs. For, if he, which now is not able to guard his *Indian* fleet, may (while we are talking) haue but one or two returnes in safetie: If he, which now feeles the strẽgth of Englãd & the Lowe Countries as they are vnited, can for the present so seuer them in Counsell and affection, that he may hereafter more easily diuide them in parts: If he that

neuer wantes malice (but now wants ſtrength) can bring vs aſleepe with the ſweete name of peace, till he may rowze vs from ſleepe by a thundring warre; his gaine and our loſſe (by this bare pretence) will quickly appeare. Then, for aſſuraunce, we giue the Enemie as good as hee can deſire. For, in forbearing him when he is weakeſt, and letting goe our aduantages when they are greateſt, wee plainely ſhewe, that nothing can drawe vs to warre, if wee may haue peace. But, on the other ſide, if a nation, that neuer treated with vs, but to deceaue vs (and thinks our Religion but Hereſie, our Church Schiſmaticall, and our Queene excommunicated; ſo as by their owne principles, they are neither to keepe faith with vs, nor to let vs receaue any good by them) ſhall make a contract with vs, what aſſurance, I ſay can we haue of ſuch an Enemie, and in ſuch a bargaine? Forſooth, firſt, to deceaue vs, and ſerue their owne turne by making a peace: and then, breaking it, they hold it no faulte: next, if they did, the Popes diſpenſation will take it away: and laſtly, though the Spaniard beare a face (and make a great ſhewe) of faith, and will not ſeeme voluntarily to breake it; yet, when his turne is ſerued, the Pope may ſo charge him to breake with vs, as conſcience and obedience ſhall couer his malice and perfidiouſneſſe. Laſt of all, let vs conſider, what our eſtate and condition is like to bee, whenſoeuer this running knot or vnſure contract doth breake or diſſolue. Are we breakers? then ſay boldly, that wee diſcouer how groſſely we haue beene coſened, and

how

how farre the enemies proude and mischieuous designes are aduanced. Doth the enemy breake? then thinke, that his mynes into our State are all made; and that when hee makes them play, hee will quickly after giue the assault. His fleete, that now is weake, shall bee supplyed both with these Gallions hee buildes, and with all the good shippes of Christendome that will bee either bought or hyred: his Cofers, that now are empty, wil be so ful of treasure, as hee will bee able not onely to trouble Kingdomes by warre, but to purchase them with money: his Ministers and best Instruments for practise, that dare not now venture themselues to come ouer, shall then haue free accesse: and our hollow harted male-contentes (if wee haue any) that now want traffick, will bee then readie and confident to entertaine any practise: the Lowe Countries, that are now his strong enemies, either vniuersally by treatie, or in part by Conqueſt, shall be reduced to bee his obedient subiectes: our victories will bee forgotten: these men of warre, wee now haue, either driuen to seeke newe Countries and new fortunes, or consumed in a beggerly and miserable Irish warre: our nation growen generally vnwarlike; in loue with the name, and bewitched with the delights of peace: and the Spaniardes corage recouered, together with his strength; which is the naturall roote of all true confidence.

These, these (worthy Master *Bacon*) are my apprehēsions and doubts, that make me afraid to treat.

Let these bee answered, cleared, and resolued; or let any man shewe mee, how wee shall haue an honourable, safe, and durable peace, and I will imbrace both it and him with both mine armes: But till then, I say, *Iustum ijs bellum quibus necessarium; et pia arma, quibus nulla nisi in armis spes est.*

Remember, how *Bernardine Mendoza* spent his time, while he was in *England.*

FINIS.

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